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I. INTRODUCTION
The federal sentencing guidelines for environmental crimes bark loudly,
calling for sentences of imprisonment for all but the most trivial of environmental
offenses.1 Although the terms of imprisonment are not long, the prospect of even a
short period of incarceration is doubtlessly capable of getting the attention of the
white-collar professionals who commit environmental offenses.2 Research I
conducted in 2004, however, indicated that the bark of the environmental
guidelines was considerably worse than their bite.3 Judges “departed” below the
applicable guidelines range in an unusually high percentage of environmental
cases;4 barely one-third of convicted environmental defendants received prison
*

© 2009 Michael M. O’Hear, Associate Dean for Research and Professor of Law,
Marquette University Law School; J.D., B.A., Yale University; Editor, Federal Sentencing
Reporter. I am grateful to Brian Borkowicz for excellent research assistance.
1
Michael M. O’Hear, Sentencing the Green-Collar Offender: Punishment,
Culpability, and Environmental Crime, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 133, 201 (2004).
2
See id. at 145–46 (noting the belief that threat of prison is an especially valuable
tool in controlling behavior of corporate officials).
3
Id. at 206–07.
4
Id. at 210.
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sentences,5 and only about 40 percent of prison sentences exceeded one year in
length.6
Although the data contained in my 2004 study were striking at the time,
ensuing developments might appropriately raise questions as to their reliability
today. Most notably, the Supreme Court fundamentally restructured federal
sentencing law through its 2005 decision in United States v. Booker, which
changed the status of the federal sentencing guidelines from mandatory to
advisory.7 Additionally, whereas the earlier study was largely based on data from
the Clinton era,8 the Bush administration substantially modified federal charging
and plea-bargaining policies, particularly with an eye toward reducing sentencing
departure rates.9 Congress also has pressed this policy goal.10 Finally, eight years
of Republican control of the White House undoubtedly resulted in significant
changes in the ideological balance of the federal judiciary.
With such developments in mind, the time is ripe for a new assessment of
environmental sentencing practices. More specifically, my goals in this Article are
twofold. Part II updates the data from my earlier study, demonstrating a surprising
level of continuity from the Clinton to Bush presidencies, and from pre-Booker to
post-Booker periods. Simply put, despite notable institutional and legal changes,
the bark of the environmental guidelines remains considerably worse than their
bite. Moreover, the data indicate that much of the lenience in environmental
sentencing results from judges’ beliefs that the guidelines are too harsh in many
cases. Part III discusses normative implications of the bark/bite gap. In light of the
overarching purposes and premises of the federal sentencing system, the data
provide important support for a fundamental redesign of the environmental
guidelines. Failing such a redesign by the Sentencing Commission, the courts
should regard the data as providing some support for arguments by individual
defendants that particular provisions of the environmental guidelines should not be
applied to them.
A few caveats are in order. First, in such a politically charged area as
environmental crime, I should be clear at the outset that I favor neither harsher nor
5

Id. at 205.
Id. at 206.
7
543 U.S. 220 (2005).
8
E.g., O’Hear, supra note 1, at 206 (reporting data from 1995–2001).
9
See, e.g., Memorandum from Attorney General John Ashcroft to Federal
Prosecutors Regarding Department Policy Concerning Charging Criminal Offenses,
Disposition of Charges, and Sentencing, (Sept. 22, 2003), reprinted in 16 FED. SENT’G REP.
129, 132 (2003) (“The Department has a duty to ensure that the circumstances in which it
will request or accede to downward departures in the future are properly circumscribed.”).
10
See, e.g., Alan Vinegrad, The New Federal Sentencing Guidelines: The Sentencing
Commission’s Response to the Feeney Amendment, 16 FED. SENT’G REP. 98, 98 (2003)
(noting the 2003 Feeney Amendment was “intended to make it more difficult for federal
district judges to grant downward departures from the Guidelines and for such departures
to be upheld on appeal”).
6
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more lenient environmental sentences. Rather, my primary interest here is in an
environmental sentencing system that has more consistency, transparency, and
moral credibility. Second, I consider only the sentencing of individual defendants,
not corporations, which (having “no soul to damn and no body to kick”11) present
quite different issues in the punishment context.12 Third, I consider only federal
sentencing. State sentencing tends to be far more discretionary, with much less by
way of formal or binding guidance,13 and thus raises a very different set of policy
concerns. Finally, by “environmental crimes,” I mean only criminal violations of
pollution control laws14—most notably, the Clean Air Act,15 the Clean Water
Act,16 and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act.17 I do not include
violations of the Endangered Species Act18 and similar statutes that are primarily
intended to protect wildlife.
II. ASSESSING THE BITE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL GUIDELINES AFTER BOOKER
This Part presents updated data on federal environmental sentencing practices,
focusing particularly on the post-Clinton, post-Booker period. The first Section
presents background on the legal framework within which federal sentencing
occurs. Although this background is necessary to understand the data contained in
the second Section, readers who are already well-versed in the arcane law of
federal sentencing may comfortably skip ahead. The second Section compares the
Clinton-era data with the more recent 2004–2007 period, highlighting continuities
between the periods. Long prison terms remain unusual in environmental cases,
and sentences below the applicable guidelines range remain common. Finally, the
third Section advances the “judicial discomfort” hypothesis: to an unusual degree
11

John Minkes, Book Review, 48 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 418, 419 (2008) (reviewing
CHRISTOPHER HARDING, CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE: INDIVIDUALS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY (2007)) (quoting eighteenth-century English judge, Baron
Thurlow).
12
See, e.g, Frank O. Bowman, III, Drifting Down the Dnieper with Prince Potemkin:
Some Skeptical Reflections About the Place of Compliance Programs in Federal Criminal
Sentencing, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 671, 674 (2004) (“[Corporate] punishments, which
necessarily take the form of monetary fines or legal prohibitions from engaging in certain
activities, simply do not engage the emotions in the way that confinement of a human being
in a cell does.”).
13
See Joanna Shepherd, Blakely’s Silver Lining: Sentencing Guidelines, Judicial
Discretion, and Crime, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 533, 540–43 (2007) (noting only eighteen states
have sentencing guidelines and discussing “substantial differences” even among those
systems).
14
For a brief summary of these laws, see O’Hear, supra note 1, at 140–43.
15
42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2006).
16
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006).
17
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act is codified as part of the Solid
Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k (2006).
18
16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2006).
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in the federal sentencing system, judges are uncomfortable with the
appropriateness of the sentences called for by the environmental guidelines.
A. Legal Framework for Environmental Sentencing
The federal sentencing guidelines employ a two-dimensional grid to
determine sentence length.19 Knowing two variables, offense level and criminal
history score, one can use the grid to determine the particular, narrow sentencing
range that is applicable in a given case.20 Offense level is determined by reference
to guidelines that are specific to different types of offenses.21 Thus, the basic
pollution control crimes are currently handled by the set of three guidelines—
2Q1.1, 2Q1.2, and 2Q1.322—which I refer to collectively as the “environmental
guidelines.” These guidelines identify a particular “base offense level” for three
different sets of environmental offenses and indicate how the offense level should
be adjusted depending on the presence of one or more “specific offense
characteristics” (“SOCs”).23
Although regarded as “mandatory” from the date of their implementation in
1987, the federal guidelines were also interpreted to give judges a measure of caseby-case discretion in deciding whether to sentence within the applicable guidelines
range.24 Prior to Booker, two distinct types of “downward departure” were
recognized and commonly used. First, with the government’s approval, a judge
might impose a below-range sentence on the basis of a defendant’s “substantial
assistance” to the government in apprehending or prosecuting another offender.25
Second, with or without the government’s approval, a judge might depart on the
basis of mitigating circumstances that were not adequately taken into account by
the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines.26 Increasing departure
rates in the 1990s prompted actions by Congress and the Bush administration to
produce greater compliance with the guidelines by district court judges and line
prosecutors.27
19

See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A (2006)
[hereinafter SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL].
20
See id.
21
See id. at ch. 2, introductory cmt.
22
See id. §§ 2Q1.1–2Q1.3 (describing offenses related to the mishandling of
hazardous materials).
23
See generally O’Hear, supra note 1, at 197–202 (discussing the environmental
sentencing guidelines).
24
See, e.g., Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 92–100 (1996) (holding that
departures from guidelines range must be reviewed by appellate courts using the abuse of
discretion standard).
25
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 19, at § 5K1.1.
26
Id. § 5K2.0(a)(1)–(3).
27
Michael M. O’Hear, The Original Intent of Uniformity in Federal Sentencing, 74
U. CIN. L. REV. 749, 786–89 (2006).
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Two years later, the Supreme Court’s decision in Booker seemed to push in
the opposite direction, albeit with uncertain force. Booker held that the mandatory
federal guidelines, and particularly their use of judicial fact finding for the SOCs,
violated defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights to a jury trial.28 The most uncertain
question in Booker was what the remedy should be.29 Instead of ordering that jury
fact-finding be engrafted onto the mandatory guidelines, the Court decided that the
guidelines should be made merely advisory.30 The Court thus excised the portion
of the Sentencing Reform Act (the “Act”) that required sentencing judges to
impose a guidelines sentence unless the requirements for a departure were
satisfied.31 However, the Court left in place other provisions of the Act that
required the sentencing judge to “consider” the guidelines range and that
authorized appellate review of sentencing decisions.32 The Court, in short, created
something of a hybrid system that increased judicial discretion, but that also
retained key features of the mandatory guidelines regime. Left for another day was
any precise demarcation of how much judicial discretion was enhanced.
After Booker, the rate of below-range sentences increased, although not
dramatically.33 Most defendants still received within-range sentences.34 Indeed,
most of the circuit courts of appeals adopted a “presumption of reasonableness” in
favor of within-range sentences, while overturning variances with some
frequency.35
The Supreme Court addressed these practices in a trilogy of important
decisions in 2007. First, in Rita v. United States, the Court upheld the presumption
of reasonableness.36 Second, in Gall v. United States, the Court held that all
sentences, including variances, must be reviewed using the same deferential abuseof-discretion standard.37 Finally, in Kimbrough v. United States, the Court held that
a variance does not necessarily require there be something factually unusual about
a case.38 Rather, in at least some circumstances, a sentencing judge may vary
because he or she disagrees with a policy choice embodied in a guideline.39
28

543 U.S. 220, 226–27, 244 (2005).
See id. at 245.
30
Id. at 245–46.
31
Id.
32
18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(4), 3742(a)–(b) (2006).
33
See infra tbl.7. To reflect the change in legal standards, such sentences are now
described as “variances,” not “departures.”
34
Id.
35
See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 344 (2007) (identifying circuits with
presumption of reasonableness); Brief for the New York Council of Defense Lawyers as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 5–6, Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007)
(No. 06-5754) (discussing data on sentencing appeals post-Booker).
36
551 U.S. at 344.
37
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007).
38
Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 101–02 (2007).
39
Id.
29
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While the precise import of Gall and Kimbrough is open to debate in some
respects, the 2007 trilogy nonetheless clarified much regarding the post-Booker
legal landscape. Whether the doctrinal clarification will have an impact at the
district-court level remains to be seen.
B. The Updated Environmental Sentencing Data
The Section presents United States Sentencing Commission data on
environmental sentencing through fiscal year 2007, the most recent year for which
data are available.40 For purposes of interpreting the data, the reader should bear in
mind that Booker was decided midway through Fiscal Year 2005.
Table 1 indicates the frequency of prison terms as a sentence.41 As in the
1996–2001 period (the subject of my earlier study), only a little more than onethird of environmental defendants received prison terms in the 2004–2007 period.
In both periods, this percentage is far lower than was the norm for federal
defendants generally (81.6 percent in 1996–200142 and 87.1 percent in 2004–
2007). Also of note in Table 1 is a drop in the number of sentenced environmental
defendants, from an average of 110.5 per year in 1996–200143 to 85 in 2004–2007.
Table 1—Environmental Defendants Sentenced to Prison Terms
Fiscal Year

Sentenced
Environmental
Defendants

Environmental
Defendants
Receiving
Prison
Sentence

2004
2005
2006
2007
Total
1996–200144

85
89
89
77
340
663

32
32
39
23
126
240

40

Percentage of
Environmental
Defendants
Receiving
Prison
Sentence
37.6
36.0
43.8
29.9
37.1
36.2

Percentage
of All
Defendants
Receiving
Prison
Sentence
85.7
87.3
87.7
87.5
87.1
81.6

More specifically, this Section deals with cases in which the highest adjusted
offense level was based on sections 2Q1.1, 2Q1.2, or 2Q1.3 of the sentencing guidelines.
Sentencing Commission data are available online from the Federal Justice Statistics
Resource Center (“FJSRC”) at http://fjsrc.urban.org. The data presented here were
compiled from searches of the FJSRC database.
41
This includes split sentences with a prison component.
42
O’Hear, supra note 1, at 205.
43
See id.
44
The 1996–2001 data come from O’Hear, supra note 1, at 205.
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Table 2 presents data on the length of prison terms for those who were
sentenced to prison. The overwhelming majority (77.0 percent) received prison
terms of two years or less. This is close to data from the 1995–2001 period, when
80.5 percent of imprisoned defendants received terms of two years or less.45 As
Table 3 indicates, the sentence lengths for environmental defendants are generally
far less than for other federal defendants, most of whom received terms of more
than two years in both 1995–2001 and 2004–2007.46
Table 2—Length of Prison Term for Environmental Defendants Receiving
Prison Sentence
Fiscal Year

0–1 Year
(Percent)

1–2 Years
(Percent)

2–3 Years
(Percent)

3–5 Years
(Percent)

2004
2005
2006
2007
Average

50.0
43.8
35.9
43.5
42.9

28.1
28.1
43.6
34.8
34.1

9.4
15.6
17.9
21.7
15.9

12.5
3.1
2.6
0.0
4.8

More Than 5
Years
(Percent)
0.0
9.4
0.0
0.0
2.4

Table 3—Length of Prison Term for All Federal Defendants Receiving Prison
Sentence
Fiscal
Year
2004
2005
2006
2007
Average

45
46

0–1 Year
(Percent)
19.7
20.0
18.8
20.0
19.6

1–2 Years
(Percent)
21.4
21.0
20.7
19.9
20.8

2–3 Years
(Percent)
14.2
14.1
14.0
13.2
13.9

3–5 Years
(Percent)
13.1
12.7
12.8
12.7
12.8

See id. at 206.
The percentage in 1995–2001 was 57.2. See id. at 207.

More Than 5
Years (Percent)
31.5
32.2
33.7
34.1
32.9
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Table 4 indicates one reason for the low sentences in environmental cases
relative to other cases: environmental defendants tend to have much less serious
criminal histories.47 The recent data are quite consistent with the 1995–2001 data.48
Table 4—Criminal History of Sentenced Environmental Defendants
and All Sentenced Federal Defendants
Fiscal Year

2004
2005
2006
2007
Average
1995–200149

Sentenced Environmental
Defendants in Category I
(Percent)
87.0
85.4
86.5
88.3
86.8
88.3

All Sentenced Defendants in
Category I (Percent)
44.4
45.0
45.3
45.5
45.0
54.5

The relatively low criminal history of environmental defendants tends to
produce relatively low guidelines ranges. Even given that, judges may still think
the guidelines are on the harsh side for environmental defendants. One indication
of this is revealed in Table 5: more than 85 percent of environmental defendants
sentenced within the guidelines range receive the very lowest possible sentence in
that range. In such cases, the sentencing judge is suggesting he or she thinks the
guidelines range is appropriate, but only barely so. Again, the numbers are
consistent with earlier data.50
Table 5—Sentencing Within Range
Fiscal Year

2004
2005
2006
2007
Average
1997–200251

47

Environmental Defendants
Sentenced at Guideline Minimum
(Percent)
84.9
88.5
79.4
89.8
85.6
81.5

All Defendants Sentenced at
Guideline Minimum (Percent)
60.0
59.2
58.7
58.9
59.2
60.7

Category I is the lowest possible category. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL,
supra note 19, at § 5A.
48
See O’Hear, supra note 1, at 205–07.
49
Id. at 208.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 209.
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Tables 6–9 present the data on sentences outside the guidelines range.52 For
2004–2007, 50.3 percent of environmental defendants received below-range
sentences, which is close to the 48.2 percent for 1995–2001,53 and considerably
higher than the 32.2 percent for federal defendants overall.54 If governmentsponsored departures are excluded, then 23.5 percent of environmental defendants
received departures or variances, compared with 15.3 percent for federal
defendants overall.55 This underscores the extent to which judges (as opposed to
prosecutors) are making the determination that the environmental guidelines are
too harsh in many individual cases.
Table 6—Downward Departure Rates for Sentenced Environmental
Defendants
Fiscal
Year

2004
2005
2006
2007
Average

Substantial
Assistance
Departures
(Percent)
14.1
32.6
18.0
16.9
20.6

Other GovernmentSponsored
Departures (Percent)

Judicial
Departures
(Percent)

2.4
5.6
7.9
9.1
6.2

21.3
14.6
26.9
32.4
23.5

Total
Downward
Departures
(Percent)
37.6
52.8
52.8
58.4
50.3

Table 7—Downward Departure Rates for All Sentenced Federal Defendants
Fiscal
Year

2004
2005
2006
2007
Average

52

Substantial
Assistance
Departures
(Percent)
14.1
13.9
14.0
13.8
14.0

Other GovernmentSponsored
Departures (Percent)

Judicial
Departures
(Percent)

3.0
2.5
2.7
3.6
2.9

15.2
16.5
18.8
18.7
15.3

Total
Downward
Departures
(Percent)
32.3
32.9
35.5
36.1
32.2

The term “departure” is used here, although “variance” would be the preferred term
for the latter portion of the covered period.
53
See infra tbl.6; O’Hear, supra note 1, at 210 tbl.6.
54
See infra tbl.7.
55
See infra tbls.6 & 7. I refer to this rate as the “judicial departure” rate in the tables.
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Table 8—Sentences of Environmental Defendants in Relation to Guideline
Range
Fiscal Year

2004
2005
2006
2007
Average

Below
Guideline
Range
(Percent)
37.6
52.8
52.8
58.4
50.3

Within
Guideline
Range
(Percent)
54.1
40.4
43.8
39.0
44.4

Above
Guideline
Range
(Percent)
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

Data
Missing/Unknown
(Percent)
8.2
6.7
3.3
2.6
5.3

Table 9—Sentences of All Federal Defendants in Relation to Guideline Range
Fiscal Year

2004
2005
2006
2007
Average

Below
Guideline
Range
(Percent)
25.2
32.9
35.5
36.1
32.5

Within
Guideline
Range
(Percent)
66.9
60.8
59.7
58.3
61.4

Above
Guideline
Range
(Percent)
0.7
1.3
1.6
1.5
1.3

Data
Missing/Unknown
(Percent)
7.1
5.0
3.3
4.1
4.9

Figure 1 presents the overall data on below-range sentences since 1995.
Although there is remarkable year-to-year variation in the environmental
sentencing data (no doubt reflecting the relatively small number of environmental
cases), a regular pattern of peaks and valleys is nonetheless apparent. In
environmental cases, the below-range numbers have stayed consistently within the
40 to 60 percent band, under both Clinton and Bush, and pre- and post-Booker.
Given the track record of volatility in the data, it is too early to say whether the
post-Booker highs represent a long-term plateau or just another short-term peak.56

56

Differences between the immediate pre- and post-Booker periods are not
statistically significant even at the 90 percent confidence level.
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Figure 1—Percentage of Defendants Sentenced Below the Guidelines Range

Environmental
Defendants

All Defendants

Year

What seems much more certain is that environmental defendants are far more
likely to get a below-range sentence than federal defendants generally.57 Over the
1995–2007 period—thirteen consecutive years—the below-range number for
environmental defendants exceeds the general number, often by 20 percentage
points or more. Indeed, the lowest single-year number for environmental
defendants (in 2004) is still higher than the highest single-year number for all
defendants (in 2007). The environmental disparity seems not to have been much
affected either by Booker or the changeover in presidential administrations.
Nor does this disparity seem to be a generalized phenomenon of white-collar
sentencing. Figure 2, for instance, shows consistently higher departure rates for
environmental defendants than for those sentenced under the basic guideline for
economic crimes.58 Indeed, contrary to the common perception of preferential
treatment for white-collar offenders, a comparison of Figures 1 and 2 shows
consistently lower percentages of below-range sentences for the theft/fraud
defendants than for federal defendants generally.

57

Over the 1995–2007 period, the differences are statistically significant at better
than a 99 percent confidence level.
58
Section 2B1.1 covers theft, fraud, embezzlement, and the like. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 19, at § 2B1.1.
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Figure 2—Percentage of Defendants Sentenced Below the Guidelines Range

Environmental

Theft/Fraud

Year

C. The Judicial Discomfort Hypothesis
Why do environmental defendants benefit from such a high rate of belowrange sentences? There are doubtless many causes, and a systematic, quantitative
exploration of the question lies beyond the scope of this Article. This Section
focuses on just one possible explanation: that judges are uncomfortable with the
harshness of the guidelines in an unusually high proportion of environmental
cases. To put the matter differently, I hope to make the case that below-range
sentences in environmental cases result not only from the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion in support of law enforcement priorities (e.g., rewarding substantial
assistance), but also in large measure from the exercise of judicial discretion in
support of judges’ views of what is a just sentence.
Three categories of data reflect the judicial discomfort. First, and most
important, is the judicial departure rate of 23.5 percent in environmental cases over
the 2004–2007 period, more than 8 percentage points higher than the overall
judicial departure rate.59 Although judicial departures in about a quarter of
environmental cases may not at first blush seem indicative of high levels of
judicial discomfort, the data need to be assessed in context. High rates of
government-sponsored departures in environmental cases (26.8 percent60) mean
that judges often have a readily available alternative to the guidelines range
without needing to use the judicial departure mechanism. If cases with
59

See supra tbl.6.
The 26.8 percentage comes from combining the average “Substantial Assistance
Departures” and “Other Government-Sponsored Departures” from Table 6.
60
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government-sponsored departures are excluded, then the judicial departure rate
increases to 32.1 percent.61 Additionally, both pre- and post-Booker, judges are apt
to place a thumb on the scales in favor of within-range sentences. This may be for
reasons both principled (e.g., a commitment to the ideal of sentencing uniformity
that is embodied in the guidelines system) and expedient (e.g., a desire to avoid the
heightened reversal risks associated with below-range sentences even postBooker62). Thus, whatever the number of judicial departures, there may be a
sizeable number of additional cases in which the judge imposed the guidelines
sentence despite real misgivings as to whether it was truly proportionate to the
seriousness of the offense.63
Second, the government-sponsored departure rate is also suggestive of
judicial discomfort, although admittedly less clearly so. Even when the
government supports a defendant’s request for a below-range sentence, the judge is
still free to reject the request. To be sure, the request may be granted for reasons
that have nothing to do with the merits of the environmental guidelines, e.g., the
judge’s desire to encourage and reward substantial assistance. Yet a judge with a
high level of confidence in the justness of a guidelines sentence will be less open
to going below that sentence to further other policy objectives. Conversely, a judge
who is already skeptical of the guidelines sentence will need correspondingly less
persuasion. For that reason, it seems fair to view the high rate of governmentsponsored departures (26.8 percent in environmental cases, as opposed to 16.9
percent overall64) as also reflecting an unusually high degree of judicial skepticism
of the environmental guidelines.
Third, there is the high rate of sentences at the very bottom of the guidelines
range (85.6 percent in environmental cases, as against 59.2 percent overall65). In
these cases, the judge suggests that the guidelines range only just barely overlaps
with the range of what she would consider a just sentence—or that she is actually
imposing (for reasons good or bad) a guidelines sentence that she feels is too
harsh. Either way, these bottom-of-the-range sentences seem to reflect a
widespread judicial view that the guidelines are not squarely hitting the mark when
it comes to proportionate sentencing in environmental cases.

61

See supra tbl.6.
See Brief for the New York Council of Defense Lawyers, supra note 35, at 4–6
(discussing data on sentencing appeals post-Booker).
63
That the below-range sentences really are, in large measure, about proportionality
issues is supported by the Commission’s compilation of reasons for departures in the preBooker cases: putting substantial assistance to one side, the most frequently mentioned
reasons for departure in environmental cases were related to culpability issues like harm
and state of mind. O’Hear, supra note 1, at 210–12.
64
See supra tbls.6 & 7.
65
See supra tbl.5.
62
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III. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF THE BITE/BARK GAP
Should we be concerned that the environmental guidelines have a bark that is
worse than their bite? In this Part, I argue that Congress or the Sentencing
Commission should take action to close the gap between bite and bark. Separately,
in light of Rita and Kimbrough, I also consider the implications of the bite/bark
data for the court system.
A. Implications for Congress and the Sentencing Commission
If the gap between bark and bite were viewed as an important issue, Congress
and the Sentencing Commission have tools available to address the problem. In
particular, the guidelines might be made more binding (i.e., the bite brought into
greater conformity with the bark) or the content of the guidelines might be
modified (i.e., the bark brought into greater conformity with the bite). Before
considering these responses, however, this Section will first address the option of
doing nothing.
1. Do Nothing
One might argue that the guidelines’ bark should be worse than their bite. The
bark may be adequate to produce the desired deterrence effects, while the modest
bite minimizes the various social costs associated with incarceration.66 There is
something to be said for this position as a matter of abstract policy, but it plainly
runs counter to the basic premises of the federal sentencing system.
Through its adoption of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which replaced
broad discretion with sentencing guidelines, Congress endorsed a deterrence
approach that emphasizes certainty and predictability in punishment.67 More
fundamentally, Congress recognized that unwarranted disparities in sentencing,
such as treating similarly situated defendants differently, is not only unfair, but
also undermines the legitimacy of the criminal justice system.68

66

Such costs range from prison administration expenses to the harm suffered by
children when a parent is removed from the home.
67
See 28 U.S.C. § 994(f) (2006) (requiring Sentencing Commission to pay “particular
attention” to ensuring “certainty . . . in sentencing”); S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 49–50 (1985),
as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3232–33 (“[T]he existing Federal system lacks
the sureness that criminal justice must provide if it is to retain the confidence of American
society and if it is to be an effective deterrent against crime.”); O’Hear, supra note 27, at
769–70 (quoting Senator Kennedy, chief sponsor of legislation that became Sentencing
Reform Act, on importance of “certainty of punishment” as “important prerequisite in any
crime-fighting program”).
68
See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 45–46 (1985), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182,
3228–29.
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Viewed in that light, the basic problems with the do-nothing approach are in
the areas of transparency, predictability, and uniformity. Many environmental
defendants receive variances in sentencing, but close to half do not. Under Rita, the
latter defendants have little ability to challenge their sentences on appeal and
ensure that variances are being distributed in a consistent, principled fashion.69
Moreover, among the defendants who do get variances, Gall suggests there is little
basis for the appellate courts to ensure consistency in the magnitude of variances.70
In short, if we care about the reality or perception of unwarranted disparities in
sentencing, we ought to feel troubled about our current environmental sentencing
arrangements, in which variances are commonplace.
2. Make the Guidelines More Binding
To address disparity concerns, Congress might make the environmental
guidelines mandatory. This could be accomplished, notwithstanding Booker, by
providing jury fact-finding of SOCs, or by restructuring the guidelines such that
the existing sentencing ranges are converted into mandatory minimum sentences.71
Of course, it would probably not be sufficient to restore the pre-Booker level of
“bindingness”; recall that it is not clear that Booker even increased the rate of
below-guidelines sentences relative to pre-Booker trends. But to make the
environmental guidelines more mandatory even than they were pre-Booker would
take us into uncharted and risky waters. Surely, there must be some discretion
preserved for sentencing judges to consider truly unusual mitigating factors that
have not been addressed in the guidelines range.72
This points to a deeper problem with making the environmental guidelines
more binding: they do a poor job of distinguishing between high- and lowculpability defendants. I have critiqued the environmental guidelines at length

69

See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 344 (2007) (upholding presumption of
reasonableness in favor of within-range sentences); see also id. at 2468 (“[W]hen a judge
decides simply to apply the Guidelines to a particular case, doing so will not necessarily
require lengthy explanation.”).
70
See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007) (holding that even sentences
“significantly outside the Guidelines range” must be reviewed “under a deferential abuseof-discretion standard”).
71
By the latter suggestion, I have in mind the proposal for so-called “topless”
guidelines. See generally The Constitution Project Sentencing Initiative, Recommendations
for Federal Criminal Sentencing in a Post-Booker World, 18 FED. SENT’G REP. 310, 311
(2006) (describing the topless guideline proposal as one that “would have removed the tops
of existing sentencing guidelines ranges in order to comply with the apparent requirements
of Blakely v. Washington.”).
72
The jury fact-finding option would also have drawbacks in terms of procedural
cumbersomeness and prosecutorial control over which SOCs would be presented to the
jury.
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elsewhere.73 Briefly, the guidelines do not make important distinctions based on
state of mind, while they assess harm and dangerousness in such a scattershot
fashion that essentially harmless offenses can result in more serious sentences than
life-threatening ones.74 Given these problems, it is hard not to think that a high
variance rate in environmental cases may be warranted from a proportionality
standpoint. Thus, even taking into account the prospect of greater uniformity, it is
hard to summon much enthusiasm for any effort to make the existing guidelines
more binding: the cure could be worse than the disease.
3. Revise the Guidelines
I proposed a comprehensive revision of the environmental guidelines in my
2004 study.75 The proposed new guideline, which is reprinted as Appendix A to
this Article,76 offers a more coherent and systematic approach to assessing
culpability. The new guideline would likely conform more closely to the moral
intuitions of judges, thereby lessening the need for a high variance rate in our
current relatively discretionary system and helping to close the bark/bite gap. And
if the system became more mandatory, the proposed guidelines would help judges
to avoid the excessive sentences that are sometimes called for by the existing
guidelines in low-culpability cases.
It would be redundant to restate my case for the proposed revisions at length,
but there is a new objection that must be addressed now that could not have been
made in 2004. Specifically, one might argue, there is no point in improving the
guidelines because Booker has endowed judges with broad discretion to vary from
them whenever the guidelines produce an unjust result. Put differently, the judges

73

See, e.g., O’Hear, supra note 1, at 154–80.
Id. at 220–30.
75
Id. at 270–72. Central to the case for reform, federal environmental laws establish a
remarkably expansive system of criminal liability for “knowing” violations of the intricate
system of regulations and permit conditions that govern the handling of hazardous
substances and other pollutants in this country. Id. at 140–46. Indeed, the knowledge
requirement is interpreted so broadly as to create a form of “quasi-strict” liability,
permitting conviction for careless mistakes, record-keeping errors, and minor discharges
that present no measurable risk of harm to human life or the environment. Id. at 146–54,
159–80. The breadth of liability means that we must rely on the sentencing guidelines to
sort out the truly serious violations from the inconsequential, the accidental, and the
aberrational.
76
This proposed guideline assumes that the sentencing guidelines as a whole retain
their existing architecture. I have argued elsewhere for more thoroughgoing reform of the
sentencing guidelines. See, e.g., Michael M. O’Hear, Guidelines Simplification Still an
Urgent Priority, 20 FED. SENT’G REP. 347 (2008). I have also proposed a different version
of my environmental guideline that could be adapted for use in a simplified guidelines
system. See Michael M. O’Hear, Criminal Violations of Environmental Laws: Model
Sentencing Guidelines §2E1, 18 FED. SENT’G REP. 341 (2006).
74
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will do what the judges will do, so why bother fixing problems with the
guidelines?
This objection, however, misses both the intrinsic value of low variance rates
and the continued “gravitational pull” of the guidelines in the post-Booker/postRita sentencing process. First, even if the guidelines have no substantive effect, it
would still be helpful for the guidelines to be modified so as to bring them into
closer alignment with what judges are actually doing. Doing so would advance the
congressional goal of predictability in sentencing.77 Even guidelines that are, in
effect, merely descriptive of typical practices still serve the useful purpose of
providing everyone fair notice of the punishment that is likely to result from any
given criminal conduct. Moreover, legitimizing goals may also be served by the
perception—even if inaccurate—that the guidelines are constraining judicial
discretion and reducing the risks of arbitrary outcomes.78 In that sense, too, there
may be intrinsic value to a system in which variance rates are low.
Second, despite Booker, it is not plausible that the guidelines are substantively
irrelevant in the determination of sentences. To appreciate why and how the
guidelines still matter in a post-Booker world, it may be helpful to distinguish
among three types of cases in a simplified model of judicial decision making: nodeference cases, total-deference cases, and limited-deference cases. In nodeference cases, as a result of some combination of judicial temperament and other
factors, the judge will have strong feelings about the proper sentence and will
reach the desired outcome regardless of the guidelines.
At the opposite extreme, in total-deference cases, the judge will simply follow
the guidelines with little serious consideration of alternatives. Although the judge
is endowed with expanded discretion post-Booker, the judge is still required to
calculate the guidelines range,79 and, having invested the effort in doing so, the
judge will naturally be inclined to pay some attention to the result.80 Moreover, the
judge will realize that following the guidelines remains the path of least resistance.
Under Rita, the guidelines sentence will usually be affirmed with little or no need
to create an additional record beyond the guidelines calculation itself.81 In contrast,
the below-guidelines sentence will most likely have to be justified in a more

77

See O’Hear, supra note 27, at 797, 800 (discussing importance of predictability in
the Sentencing Reform Act and Feeney Amendment).
78
Cf. Michael M. O’Hear, Plea Bargaining & Procedural Justice, 42 GA. L. REV.
407, 421, 428 (2008) (discussing relationship between perceived legitimacy of decisionmaking process and use of objective criteria as basis for explaining decision).
79
See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007) (“[A] district court should begin
all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range.”
(citation omitted)).
80
Michael M. O’Hear, Explaining Sentences, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 459, 473–75
(2009).
81
See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 344 (2007)
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extensive fashion and, even at that, faces a substantial risk of reversal on appeal.82
Given these realities of post-Booker sentencing, it is easy to see why a judge would
be inclined just to defer to the guidelines, particularly if the judge otherwise lacks
strong feelings about the case.83
In the middle are the limited-deference cases: the guidelines will get some
meaningful weight in the sentencing calculus, but there is no ex ante commitment
just to follow the guidelines and be done with it. Variance arguments will get due
consideration—although, if there is a variance, the judge is not likely to move far
from the guidelines range.
It is, of course, self-evidently worthwhile to get the guidelines right for
purposes of the total-deference cases—that is, if there is any substantial number of
such cases. It is not possible to determine with any precision how common such
cases are, although the features of post-Booker sentencing discussed above provide
good reason to believe they are not infrequent. Moreover, a number of the
published post-Booker cases, including Rita itself, seem to reflect a very high level
of judicial deference to the guidelines.84
Even if one believes the number of total-deference cases to be small, it would
still be worthwhile to get the guidelines right for the limited-deference cases—and
this category is surely not small. With the special weight given to the guidelines in
post-Booker sentencing processes, it is hard to believe that judges are giving the
guidelines no substantive deference at all. And, to the extent the guidelines are
given meaningful weight—which might manifest itself as a de facto presumption
against variance or as a disinclination to vary far from the guidelines range—we
should want them to reflect a coherent, principled approach to punishment.
4. Summary
We should be concerned about the bite/bark gap in environmental sentencing
in light of the transparency and uniformity goals of the federal sentencing system.
It makes little sense, however, to address this problem in a way that would push
judges to adhere more closely to guidelines that do not appropriately distinguish
between high- and low-culpability defendants as there is no good reason to favor
uniformity over proportionality. Revised environmental guidelines with a more
coherent approach to culpability can advance both objectives: high-deference

82

See Gall, 552 U.S. at 50 (“If [the sentencing judge] decides that an outsideGuidelines sentence is warranted, he must consider the extent of the deviation and ensure
that the justification is sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the variance.”);
Brief for the New York Council of Defense Lawyers, supra note 35, at 5–6 (discussing
data on sentencing appeals post-Booker).
83
See United States v. Cunningham, 429 F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting “the
temptation to a busy judge to impose the guidelines sentence and be done with it”).
84
See O’Hear, supra note 80, at 466–67 (noting how little attention district court
judge seemed to pay to variance argument in Rita).
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judges will more reliably impose proportionate sentences, while low-deference
judges will more reliably impose uniform sentences.85
B. Implications for the Courts
If the Sentencing Commission does not act to reform the environmental
guidelines, individual sentencing judges can and should use their enhanced postBooker discretion to reject disproportionate guidelines sentences, while appellate
courts should also be especially wary of sentencing judges who simply follow the
environmental guidelines without regard to plausible variance arguments. To be
sure, even in the pre-Booker period, sentencing judges could (and with surprising
frequency did) depart in environmental cases to avoid troubling results. But two
features of the pre-Booker doctrinal landscape made it difficult to imagine the
courts systematically playing an effective role as guarantors of proportionality.
First, absent prosecutorial support, sentencing judges were prohibited from
departing from the guidelines except on the basis of unusual case-specific facts that
had not been adequately considered by the Sentencing Commission in formulating
the environmental guidelines.86 Thus, judges could not depart in cases that
appeared to be routine, or factually typical. Second, appellate courts could not
review a sentencing judge’s decision not to depart from the guidelines.87
Both of these critical features of the pre-Booker landscape have been
eliminated. First, in Kimbrough, the Supreme Court indicated that a judge may
impose a below-guidelines sentence even in a typical crack cocaine case on the
basis of the judge’s disagreement with the harshness of the crack guidelines.88 It is
true, of course, that the crack guidelines have a unique history, and some lower
courts have accordingly suggested that Kimbrough may be limited to that, or a very
similar, context.89 In particular, the Kimbrough Court itself emphasized, “The
crack cocaine guidelines . . . do not exemplify the [Sentencing] Commission’s
exercise of its characteristic institutional role. In formulating Guidelines ranges for

85

To be sure, my emphasis on proportionality tends to exclude the sort of attentiongetting extreme sentence that might be thought to have particular value in deterring
environmental violations. As I have argued elsewhere, however, the deterrence effects of
harsh punishment may be much less important in securing compliance with environmental
laws than the overall moral credibility of the regulatory system, which is weakened, not
strengthened, by disproportionate sentences. O’Hear, supra note 1, at 253–55.
86
18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2006).
87
See, e.g., United States v. Portela, 167 F.3d 687, 708 (1st Cir. 1999); United States
v. Caban, 173 F.3d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 1999).
88
Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 101–02 (2007).
89
See, e.g., United States v. Vega-Castillo, 540 F.3d 1235, 1239 (11th Cir. 2008)
(“Kimbrough dealt only with certain Guidelines—those that, like the crack cocaine
Guidelines, ‘do not exemplify the [Sentencing] Commission’s exercise of its characteristic
institutional role.’” (quoting Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 101–02)).
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crack cocaine offenses . . . the [Sentencing] Commission . . . did not take account
of ‘empirical data and national experience.’”90
Yet even if the Kimbrough power to reject a guideline in routine cases is
limited to guidelines in which the Sentencing Commission has not exercised its
“characteristic institutional role,” the environmental guidelines would still qualify.
As the Court itself suggested in Kimbrough, the Sentencing Commission’s
characteristic role is to base guidelines on empirical analysis of actual sentencing
practices.91 The environmental guidelines, however, were not based on actual
sentencing practices,92 and they continue to be out of step with what judges are
actually doing in environmental cases. The Sentencing Commission’s failure to
play its characteristic role thus qualifies environmental defendants for Kimbrough
variances even on a cautious reading of Kimbrough.
Second, as Rita affirmed, a sentencing judge’s post-Booker decision not to
vary is now subject to appellate review for “reasonableness.”93 To be sure, as Rita
also affirmed, the appellate court may accord a presumption of reasonableness to a
within-range sentence.94 The presumption, however, is a rebuttable one.95
Moreover, there are good reasons to treat the presumption as a particularly weak
one in the environmental sentencing context. The Rita Court found the
presumption an appropriate way to recognize that the guidelines embody a “rough
approximation” of the statutory purposes of sentencing.96 Thus, the Court once
again emphasized the empirical foundation of the guidelines, as well as the
evolutionary process by which the Sentencing Commission may amend the
guidelines based on actual sentencing practices.97 As to guidelines (like the
environmental guidelines) that do not, in fact, emerge from the Sentencing
Commission playing this “characteristic role,” the justification for the presumption

90

Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 101–02 (quoting United States v. Pruitt, 502 F.3d 1154,
1171 (10th Cir. 2007)).
91
For a description of the Sentencing Commission’s “empirical approach,” see
O’Hear, supra note 27, at 780.
92
O’Hear, supra note 1, at 201 nn.366 & 368; see also Paul D. Kamenar, The
Environmental Sentencing Guidelines Are Fatally Flawed and Unreasonable, 8 MD. J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 97, 103–05 (1997) (arguing that environmental guidelines violate
congressional mandate requiring Sentencing Commission to consider past sentencing
practices in developing guidelines).
93
Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 358–60 (reviewing within-range sentence
using reasonableness standard).
94
Id. at 347.
95
Id. at 336. Moreover, Rita only permits, and does not require, appellate courts to
employ the presumption. See id. at 340 (“The most important question before us is whether
the law permits the courts of appeals to use this presumption. We hold that it does.”
(emphasis added)).
96
Id. at 349–51.
97
Id. at 349.
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of reasonableness is particularly attenuated, and the presumption should be given
little weight in the appellate review process.
Thus, the new post-Booker landscape provides a more favorable doctrinal
framework for both district court and appellate court judges to enforce basic
principles of proportionality in sentencing, even where the guidelines call for
disproportionate outcomes. And if judges continue to take advantage of this
framework with increasing frequency in environmental cases, perhaps the
Sentencing Commission will finally feel obliged to act pursuant to the evolutionary
model extolled by Rita and revise the environmental guidelines in light of actual
practices.
To be sure, if the courts follow the path I suggest here, there may be an
increase in the variance rate in environmental cases, which might be seen as
sacrificing uniformity for proportionality. On the other hand, when variance rates
are already extraordinarily high, there seems little to lose on the uniformity front.
Indeed, when variances are granted in more than half of environmental cases (as
has happened every year so far since Booker), it may be that uniformity interests
are advanced, not undermined, by a further increase in the variance rates.
IV. CONCLUSION
The gap between the bark and the bite of the environmental sentencing
guidelines remains high post-Clinton presidency and post-Booker. I suspect that
some environmentalists will see in this data a reason to support mandatory
minimums or other measures that will better ensure substantial prison sentences for
environmental offenders. I see the problem, however, not necessarily as one of
inadequate severity, but as one of inadequate transparency and uniformity.
Mandatory minimums may address these concerns, but likely at too great a cost in
proportionality. Long prison terms for violations that are accidental or minimally
harmful diminish the moral credibility of the regulatory system. It would be
preferable to redesign the environmental guidelines so that they better assure
lenient sentences for low-culpability violators. Redesigned guidelines along these
lines would have more credibility both with judges (who might then be more
inclined to defer to the guidelines when they do call for harsh sentences) and with
the regulated community (which might then view the environmental regulatory
regime as fairer and more legitimate).
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APPENDIX A

Proposal for Revised Environmental Guideline to Replace
Sections 2Q1.1, 1.2, & 1.3
§2Q1.1 Mishandling of Hazardous or Toxic Substances, Pesticides, and
Other Regulated Environmental Pollutants; Recordkeeping, Tampering, and
Falsification
(a) Base Offense Level: 6
(b) Specific Offense Characteristics
Defendant
Recklessly
Disregarded
Risk of Harm

Defendant
Negligently
Disregarded
Risk of Harm

Increase by
22 levels

Defendant
Knew Harm
Was
Practically
Certain to
Result
Increase by
18 levels

Increase by
14 levels

Increase by
8 levels

Increase by
18 levels

Increase by
14 levels

Increase by
10 levels

Increase by
4 levels

Increase by
14 levels

Increase by
10 levels

Increase by
6 levels

No Increase

Increase by
12 levels

Increase by
8 levels

Increase by
4 levels

Decrease by
2 levels

Increase by
8 levels

Increase by
4 levels

No Increase

Decrease by
4 levels

Defendant’s
Purpose Was
to Cause
Threatened
Type of Harm
Imminent
Danger of Death
or Serious
Bodily Harm
Imminent
Danger of
Large-Scale
Environmental
Harm
Imminent
Danger of
Localized
Environmental
Harm
Lesser Degree
of Danger of
Environmental
Harm
Danger of
Regulatory
Harm Only
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Application Notes:
1. The purpose of this section is to establish sentences for environmental
offenders that are proportionate to their culpability, based chiefly on three
considerations: the magnitude of the harm threatened by the offense, the likelihood
that the harm would occur, and the offender’s intent with respect to the threatened
harm. These considerations are reflected in the two-dimensional matrix for specific
offense characteristics. The vertical axis distinguishes among offenders based on
the severity of the harm threatened and the likelihood of that harm occurring.
These should be measured according to reasonable expectations as to the
consequences of the offense, i.e., what a reasonable person with the defendant’s
knowledge at the time of the offense would expect would happen as a result of the
offense. The horizontal axis distinguishes among offenders based on their state of
mind as to the threatened harms.
2. “Environmental harm” means any non-trivial injury caused by the
introduction of hazardous substances or other pollutants into the environment. The
term includes such categories of harm as physical injury and emotional distress
suffered by human beings, diminution in property values, environmental
remediation expenses, disruptions to business or other social activities, permanent
damage to the integrity of an ecosystem, and death of plants and animals.
3. “Large-scale environmental harm” means environmental harm on a scale that
might fairly be thought of as “disastrous.” In determining whether threatened
harms are on this scale, the following considerations may be relevant: the
geographical scale of the harm, the duration of the harm, the irreparability of the
harm, the possibility of physical injury to human beings, the number of people
affected, the number of plants and animals affected, and the economic value of the
harm. Examples of large-scale environmental harm include: irreparable destruction
of hundreds of acres of ecologically rich wetlands; exposure of dozens of people to
a highly toxic substance; evacuation of an entire town for more than a month; and
the closure of a popular beach for a year, with catastrophic financial losses for
local businesses.
4. “Localized environmental harm” means substantial environmental harm that
does not reach the level of “large-scale environmental harm.” Examples of
localized environmental harm include soil and groundwater contamination that can
be contained and remediated so as to prevent significant human health risks; death
of a small number of animals, without long-term threats to the viability of a
population or an ecosystem; and discharges of air or water pollution that may
contribute to violations of air or water quality standards.
5. “Regulatory harm” means harm to the integrity of the environmental
regulatory system. Environmental violations that do not threaten environmental
harm, including some reporting and recordkeeping violations, will nonetheless

1174

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 4

generally threaten regulatory harms. Regulatory harms may include the costs to
regulatory and enforcement agencies of investigating and prosecuting the
underlying environmental violation; impairment of the ability of governmental
agencies, legislatures, and scientific bodies to monitor, assess, and respond
appropriately to environmental risks; and loss of public confidence in the
effectiveness of the environmental regulatory system. While regulatory harms
should generally be regarded as less severe than environmental harms, they may be
appropriately considered at sentencing, particularly, as indicated in the culpability
matrix, where the offender has purposefully or knowingly acted so as to undermine
the integrity of the regulatory system.
6. The categories on the vertical axis should not be employed in a mechanistic
fashion, but, rather, so as to effectuate the goal of the vertical axis, i.e., the
assessment of relative culpability based on the harm threatened and the likelihood
that the threatened harm would occur. If the culpability of the offender’s conduct is
not adequately captured by any of the five categories, then an upward or downward
departure should be employed, consistent with the basic structure of the matrix.
Thus, for instance, if the offense conduct created an imminent danger of
environmental harm that is clearly in excess of localized harm, but also clearly less
than large-scale harm, the court should enhance the offense level to a midway
point between localized and large-scale harm.
7. The vertical axis reflects threatened harm, not actual harm. Harm that actually
occurred may, however, have some probative value in determining whether the
threat of a particular harm was imminent. Moreover, where actual harm clearly and
substantially differs from threatened harm, an upward or downward departure
along the vertical axis to a midrange point between the actual and threatened harm
may be appropriate.
8. The horizontal, state-of-mind axis relates to the offender’s knowledge and
intent with respect to the threatened harms. The four categories are intended to
track the basic mens rea categories of the Model Penal Code.
9. If the offender’s violation of the law was a result of a justifiable
misunderstanding of the law, a downward departure may be appropriate to the
extent that the misunderstanding mitigates the offender’s culpability. A departure
on this basis will normally be limited to circumstances in which the offense
conduct threatens no more than localized environmental harm and the offense
conduct is otherwise reasonable. A misunderstanding of the law is not justifiable
unless it is based on an authoritative interpretation of the law from an appropriate
governmental agency, and no contrary authoritative interpretation is available at
the time of the offense. The reasonability of the offender’s conduct should be
assessed by reference to the severity of the harm threatened by the conduct, the
likelihood of the harm occurring, the extent to which the risk of harm was merely
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to the offender’s own person or property, the social benefits of the offender’s
conduct (if any), and the availability of cost-effective alternatives to the offender’s
conduct that would have reduced or eliminated the threat of harm.

